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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RULES ON
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION*
Arthur Lenhofft
I
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: TERRITORIAL SUPREMACY
It is generally recognized that public international law has not yet
developed rules providing for an exclusive delimitation of judicial juris-
diction among the members of the community of states.' Where we speak
of "international jurisdiction," therefore, we are referring merely to the
fact that the litigation contains foreign elements, and not to the source
of the jurisdiction exercised.2
However, the statement that at present there are no rules of general
international law providing for such a delimitation over the same trans-
action,' is based on the presupposition that by exercise of jurisdiction
in the given case a state does not "overstep the limits which international
law places upon its jurisdiction." The words set between quotation marks
are taken from the famous decision of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice in The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey). 4
Said the Court:
[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a
State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it
may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.5
Thus, leaving aside a few narrowly defined "permissions,"6 it is clear
* This article constitutes section 1 of chapter 2 of the author's book, jurisdiction and
judgments: A Comparative Study, to be published for the Parker School of Foreign and
Comparative Law of Columbia University by Oceana Publications, Inc.
t D.U.J. 1908, University of Vienna. Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, State
University of New York, School of Law at Buffalo.
1 1 Niboyet, Traiti de Droit International Priv6 Franqais, No. 53, at 68 (1938-1949)
[hereinafter cited as Niboyet]; 1 Sperl, Lehrbuch der Burgelichen Rechtspflege 29 (1925-
1930) [hereinafter cited as Speri, Lehrbuch]; Wolff, Private International Law 53, 251 (2d
ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as Wolff]; Verdross-Drossberg, "Void and Punishable Acts
of State in International Law," 2 Western Polit. Q. 183, 184 (1949). See also ch. I, § 1(c)
of the author's forthcoming book.
2 Naturally the same objections which have been raised so often against the term "private
international law" have been made against the terms "international procedural law," "inter-
national competence," etc. See, e.g., Cheshire, Private International Law 16 (6th ed. 1952);
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 9 (3d ed. 1949).
3 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 37, comment a at 106 (1962). See also Fisher,
35 ALI Proceedings 453 (1958).
4 P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 10, at 19 (1927). See also Jessup, Transnational Law 35 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Jessup].
5 The Case of the S.S. "Lotus," supra note 4, at 18; Verdross-Drossberg, supra note 1,
at 184.
0 A discussion of the exceptions permitted under international law does not fall within
the scope of this study. It may suffice to refer to jurisdiction aboard national vessels or
aircraft, or jurisdiction over a member of the armed forces in a foreign state consenting
to their presence. See Restatement, Foreign Relations Law §§ 47-65 (1962).
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that a state may not use adjudicatory or compulsory methods within
the territory of another state.7
The exercise of acts of international judicial assistance in a foreign
country calls for attention in this connection. Among such acts, the
service of .papers and the examination of witnesses in a foreign state
have played the most important role.8 Where service is made by, or
depositions are taken before, private persons, the exercise of judicial
powers would appear not to be involved.' However, it is difficult'to
arrive at the same conclusion where a commissioner is appointed by the
court in which an action is pending to make the examination in a foreign
country, for example, Italy, or where a onsul is requested by a party
to the action to serve a summons, notice or subpoena on a witness
abroad. Functions of this kind, if carried out by such persons, clearly
involve the exercise of official powers in a foreign country. It is true
that in Blackmer v. United States, ° the United States Supreme Court
denied that the service of subpoenas upon an American citizen in France,
requiring his appearance in an American criminal proceeding, constituted
an invasion of any right of the foreign government. However, this view
was vigorously criticized; no less eminent a legal scholar than Wigmore
considered the act as an attempted exercise of state power within the
territory of a foreign state.'-
However, our concern in this study is not with the exercise of the
jurisdiction of a state outside its territory; we are concerned, rather,
with the limitations derived from international-law concepts which re-
strict the intraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction by a state over persons
and activities outside its territory. This article will, therefore, deal
first with the assertion of jurisdiction against persons regardless of their
presence within the state. Next will follow an examination of jurisdiction-
al limitations based on the extraterritorial nature of the subject matter;
this examination will deal with both criminal proceedings and civil
proceedings. Finally, some general considerations will be given to the
concurrence of the jurisdictional claims of different states, leaving the
more detailed discussion of the subject to subsequent sections of the
study from which this article is adapted.
7 Id. §§ 32, 47-65; Jessup 35.
8 For this question, see particularly Smit, "International Aspects of Federal Civil Proce-
dure," 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1031, 1040 (1961).
9 Smit, "International Co-operation in Civil Litigation: Some Observations on the Roles
of International Law and Reciprocity," 9 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht
137, 146 (1962).
10 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (service of subpoenas in Paris by American consul on American
citizen living there).
21 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2195c (3d ed. 1940); See Smit, supra note 8, at 146. But see
Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 63, comment b (1962).
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II
INTRATERRITORIAL EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER PARTIES
ABROAD AND OVER EXTRATERRITORIAL ACTMTIES
1. Is the Presence of the Defendant an International-Law Requirement?
Aside from the rule of general international law prescribing immunity
of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state from the jurisdiction of
the receiving state, 2 there are at present "no rules of international law
specifically governing the jurisdiction of a state to prescribe rules for
the adjudication or other determination of claims of a private nature."' 3
It must not be overlooked that the exercise of jurisdiction in civil matters,
in contrast to criminal matters, does not compel application of the lex
Jori.
The following illustrations show the degree to which personal juris-
diction in civil matters has been extended by the law of certain important
countries: According to Article 14 of the French Civil Code, the French
nationality of the plaintiff is sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction
even though the defendant may be an alien, neither domiciled, nor
resident, nor present in France. And in several countries, such as
Austria, Germany, Japan, and Sweden, and in many Swiss cantons, an
action in personam can be brought against a person who merely has
property there, even if that property has practically no value.' 4
Whether or not judgments based on such jurisdictional rules will be
enforceable in other countries is a different question; they may be denied
recognition out of considerations of public policy, of natural justice, or
of due process. 5 It is noteworthy that these jurisdictional bases are not
recognized in the treaties and conventions dealing with the reciprocal
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, to which the states
mentioned above are parties. 6 It is also highly probable that, if the
12 See ch. 7 text at note 29 of the author's forthcoming book.
13 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 19, comment d at 63 (1962) (making a. reserva-
tion for cases of "denial of justice"). See also id. § 186.
14 Procedural Codes of Austria, § 99; Germany,' § 23; Japan, § 8; Sweden, ch. 10, § 3.
For the pertinent sections of the various Swiss cantonal codes, see 1 Guldener, Das
Schweizerisches Zivilprozessrecht 76 (1947). See generally, Wolff 72.15 Graupner, "Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Western Europe," 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 367, 375 (1963) (referring also to the
English Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature, particularly order XI rule 1(e), and, to
vouching in a foreign third party regardless of the controlling law, under Belgian, Dutch,
French, Luxembourg, and Italian law); Nadelmann, "Jurisdictionally Improper Fora," in
Twentieth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law 321, 327 (1961).16 Thus, according to the conventions of Great Britain with France (1934), Western
Germany (1961), and Austria (1962), neither the mere nationality of the plaintiff nor the
mere fact that defendant has property in the judgment states is recognized as a basis forjurisdiction. It is particularly noteworthy that even under the 1959 convention between
Austria and Germany, the domestic law of both of which includes such a forum, the presence
of property (with insignificant exceptions) is not regarded as sufficient for the recognition
of a judgment. See art. 2(4).
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United States should become a party to a treaty or convention of such
kind, its traditional basis of personal jurisdiction-namely, physical
presence of the defendant in the forum at the time of service of process 17
-would be excluded, at least with respect to jurisdiction based upon
service on the most casual transient."8
However, it must be emphasized that the very fact that so many
important nations have adopted these bases of personal jurisdiction
precludes any assumption that a general rule of international law exists
to the contrary. Only a practice accepted as law by general consent can
be regarded as a rule of customary, that is, general, international law.'9
The effect of jurisdictional limitations when embodied in treaties or
conventions is, of course, limited to the contracting parties, and the
application of conventional rules usually falls within the province of
national rather than international bodies.20 Since, therefore, there is no
supranational authority which limits the jurisdiction of a state to persons
residing within its territorial confines,2 ' each state may fashion the con-
tent of the law on this subject as it chooses. This law, as an Italian
writer puts it, is "national law in international matters" (diritto interno
in materia internazionale) .2 \\
Aside from limitations imposed by international conventions and
treaties, a state is free to determine for itself its policy as to such personal
jurisdiction.' For this reason, the real question is the extent to which
the state has given competence to its courts to exercise such jurisdiction. 24
In a few federations, such as the United States and Mexico, each
member state has a legal system of its own which, inter alia, regulates
matters relating to the conflict of laws such as international and inter-
state jurisdiction. Consequently, the only barriers to a member state's
power to prescribe and to enforce rules of personal jurisdiction are
17 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 78 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956) ; Schlesinger,
"Methods of Progress in Conflict of Laws-Some Comments on Ehrenzweig's Treatment of
Transient Jurisdiction," 9 J. Pub. L. 313 (1960).18 Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws § 30, at 103 (1962) ; Leflar, Conflict of Laws 44 (1959).
19 1 Oppenheim, International Law-A Treatise § 21a (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1948-1952).
20 12 Aubry & Rau, Cours de droit civil francais § 748 bis, at 30 & n.1 (5th ed. Bartin
1922) ; For recent cases, see 1 Kiss, Repertoire de la pratique en matiere de droit inter-
national public 442-43 (1952).
21 There still remains the question whether general international law limits the assertion
of jurisdiction by a state over conduct outside its borders. This problem will be dealt with
in subsequent subsections.
22 Morelli, I1 Diritto Processuale Civile Internazionale 1 (2d ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited
as Morelli]. The expression "external law of the state" ("diritto statuale esterno") has also
been used. Ibid.
28 For a proper distinction between a state's jurisdictional power and its jurisdictional
policy, see Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad 286 (1958). See also Reese,
Changing Concepts of Jurisdiction (unpublished summary of address given before the
American Foreign Law Association 1963).24 Reese, supra note 23.
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federal constitutional prohibitions such as the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution or of article 14
of the Constitution of Mexico.
Particularly in the United States, decisional and statutory law have
given the courts a free hand to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident
individuals and foreign corporations. This result has been achieved by
a construction of the due process clause which requires, for the assertion
of jurisdiction in personam over such defendants, only that they have
certain minimum contacts with the territory of the forum.25
It may be recalled that the preceding discussion is restricted to personal
jurisdiction in civil actions or proceedings. By the law of most countries
the presence of the accused within the territory of the forum state, at
least at the trial, is an essential prerequisite for the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction.26
2. Limitations on Criminal Jurisdiction Ex Ratione Materiae
Let us suppose that there is indisputable jurisdiction over the person
of an accused as, for example, by reason of his appearance through
regular process. Then another question may arise: Will the fact that the
subject matter involves his extraterritorial conduct clash with rules of
general international law? (We are here assuming the absence of any
regulation by treaty.) To ask the question is to bring up a subject of
great controversy. The authority of the Permanent Court in the Lotus
case is invoked by writers on both sides in support of their views.28
The legal basis of this decision was a provision of the Treaty of
Lausanne entered into on July 24, 1923, between Turkey, on the one
hand, and the Allied and Associated Powers, of which France was one,
on the other. That provision, Article 15, reads:
Subject to the provisions of Article 16 (dealing with matters of personal
25 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See also Empire Steel Corp.
v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 823, 366 P.2d 502 (1961) ; Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 IM. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). See also Berry v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
80 N.J. Super. 321, 193 A.2d 569 (Super. Ct. 1963), where jurisdiction was sustained over
Southern Railway, a foreign corporation owning no tracks in New Jersey and having no
office or business there, which was sued for injuries suffered by plaintiff in an accident in
Georgia upon alighting from defendant's train; the only contact with the forum was the
fact that plaintiff had purchased a round-trip ticket in New Jersey through co-defendant
Pennsylvania Railroad's ticket agent; the statute invoked was N.J. Rules 4:4-4(d), which
contains the proviso, "subject to due process of law." See also Il1. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, §§ 16-
17 (1961); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 301-02.
26 Sarkar, "The Proper Law of Crime in International Law," 11 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 446,
465 (1962).
27 A defendant who has been removed by irregular means from another state can only
challenge the jurisdiction of the forum if his seizure was in violation of a treaty. Jessup 60;
1 Dahm, Volkerrecht 280 (1958); Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 56 Am. J. Intl L. 805,
835 passim (1962).
28 See, on the one hand, Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 77
(1942) [hereinafter cited as Cook] and, on the other, Restatement, Foreign Relations Law
§ 18, at 59-60 (1962).
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status), all questions of jurisdiction (compitence judiciaire) shall, as be-
tween Turkey and the other contracting Powers, be decided in accordance
with the principles of international law.2 9
The case arose out of a collision on the high seas between the French
mail steamer "Lotus" and the Turkish collier "Boz-Kourt," in which
the latter sank and several Turkish citizens lost their lives. The arrest
and conviction of the French first officer in Turkey raised the question
of the jurisdiction of the Turkish authorities, which was strongly con-
tested by France. The Court declared that there is no general rule of
international law which:
[P]rohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in
respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad,
and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law.
Such a view would only be tenable if international law contained a general
prohibition to States to extend the application of their laws and the juris-
diction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their terri-
tory .... But this is certainly not the case under international law as it
stands at present .... [I] t leaves them in this respect a wide measure of
discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as
regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which'
it regards as best and most suitable.30
The Court added that the foregoing considerations, which are addressed
to international jurisdiction in general, also "apply as regards criminal
jurisdiction,"'" the case at issue being of a criminal character.
However, to terminate the discussion at this point would make the
legal picture incomplete. The French Government had argued in the
Lotus case that under international law the fact that the victim was a
national of the forum would be insufficient to justify its exercise of
jurisdiction over a foreigner for his extraterritorial acts.32 The Court
stated that it was unnecessary to consider this contention, since it could
only be used:
[I] f international law forbade Turkey to take into consideration the fact
that the offence produced its effects on the Turkish vessel and conse-
quently in a place assimilated to Turkish territory in which the application
of Turkish criminal law cannot be challenged .. ..
And the Court went on:
No argument has come to the knowledge of the Court from which it could
be deduced that States recognize themselves to be under an obligation
towards each other only to have regard to the place where the author of
the offence happens to be at the time of the offence. On the contrary, it is
29 P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 10, at 16.
30 Id. at 19.
31 Id. at 20.
32 Id. at 7.
83 Id. at 23. [Emphasis added.]
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certain that the courts of many countries, even of countries which have
given their criminal legislation a strictly territorial character, interpret
criminal law in the sense that offences, the authors of which at the moment
of commission are in the territory of another State, are nevertheless to be
regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one of the
constituent elements of the offence, and more especially its effects, have
taken place there. French courts have, in regard to a variety of situations,
given decisions sanctioning this way of interpreting the territorial prin-
ciple ....84
Thus did the Court broaden the concept of territoriality.
It should be observed that the Court regarded these effects as having
taken place within the territory of the state because they were produced
on one of its vessels. Would it take the same approach if the collision
on the high seas had occurred in 1963 and not in 1926? The answer
would probably be in the negative since no fewer than twenty-seven
states (not including either France or Turkey) have ratified the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas of April 29, 1958.85 Article 11, paragraph 1
of the convention allots jurisdiction in a case involving the penal re-
sponsibility of a person in the service of the ship to the flag state or to
his national state. But, for the purpose of our discussion of limitations on
jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct, we need not elaborate upon
the treatment of the Turkish ship as part of the territory of Turkey,
particularly so because the Court had already denied that jurisdictional
limitations follow from extraterritoriality per se.88 However, the Court
stated in this later portion of the opinion that the existence of local
effects constituted an alternative criterion for the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over conduct abroad, the localization of constituent elements
of the crime being the other criterion.
It will be noted here-but only parenthetically, since jurisdiction over
civil matters will be discussed in the following subsection-that the
Court restricted its reasoning to criminal jurisdiction. Whether its effects
test applies also to civil matters presents a nice question. Walter Wheeler
Cook, a noted authority in the field of private international law, seems
to restrict this test to criminal jurisdiction,ar but this view is not
generally accepted. 8 In the opinion of the American Law Institute:
The Court makes it clear, after its analysis of the practice of states, that
the effect in the territory of conduct occurring outside it provides a state
with a valid basis of jurisdiction under international law. That part of the
opinion of the court is still valid .... 39
34 Ibid.
85 13 UST 2312, TIAS 5200.
386 P.C.IJ. ser. A, No. 10, at 19, quoted in text accompanying note 30 supra.
37 Cook 75.
38 See, e.g., Verdross, Volkerrecht 142 (1937).
89 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 18, at 60 (1962) [emphasis added]; Wengler,
1964]
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It is not difficult to see the reasons which argue against subjection of
an alien to the criminal jurisdiction of one state for his conduct in an-
other.40 Hence the firm grip held by the territorial principle in inter-
national law. However, international law has gradually come to recognize
"exceptions," 4 1 one of which is embodied in the "universality principle,"
as the Austrian Penal Code, the pioneer in this field, shows; jurisdic-
tion is here asserted by a state having custody of a foreigner who has
committed a felony in a foreign state which has rejected or failed to
request extradition; the law applied is the lex fori, subject only to any
more lenient provisions in the lex loci.
42
It is important to bear in mind that it is the lex fori which is applied
whenever the state has "exceptionally" extended its criminal jurisdiction
to aliens for crimes committed abroad.4 ' At present the "protective prin-
ciple" constitutes the most important exception to the territoriality
principle. It has evolved since the time of the French Revolution under
the impact of nationalistic political philosophy. Extraterritorial acts,
whether by nationals or by foreigners, which threaten the security or
integrity of the forum state, are regarded as justifying the extension of
its criminal jurisdiction to them even if the acts are not crimes under the
lex loci. Where the application of the protective principle is kept within
these limits, it is a generally recognized exception to the territorial
principle. It was first articulated in 1808 in the French Code of Criminal
Procedure, where control by the French penal law is pronounced over
extraterritorial activities of an alien constituting a "crime against the
security of the State, of counterfeiting the seal of the State, national
currency, national documents, or bank notes authorized by law." The
French code served as model for more or less similar provisions enacted
in most civil-law countries."
"The Significance of the Principle of Equality in the Conflict of Laws," 28 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 822, 840 (1963).
40 For some of the reasons, see Brewster, supra note 23, at 289.
41 See Dickinson, "Introductory Comment to Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime,"
Harvard Research in International Law, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 443, 445 (1935); H. Don-
nedieu de Vabres, Les Principes modernes du droit penal international 135, 153 et seq. (1928);
Stimson, Conflict of Criminal Laws 25 (1936).
42 Austrian Penal Code §§ 39-40; Argentine Law of August 20, 1885, art. 5; Italian
Penal Code art. 10.
43 A court sitting as criminal court cannot apply the penal norms of a foreign state. Chief
Justice Marshall, in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825) ("The courts of no
country execute the penal laws of another."); Neuhaus, Die Grundbegriffe des Internation-
alen Privatrechts 120 (1962); 4 Niboyet, Traite No. 1111, at 29; Wolff 171.
44 Code d'instruction criminelle (1808) arts. 5-6 (now Code de procedure penale art. 694).
See also Cour de Cassation, chambre criminelle, Jan. 4, 1920, Urios, D. 1920. 1. 33; Feb. 22,
1923, Bayot, D. 1924, I. 136 [hereinafter cited as Cass. crim.]. For other countries, see
Austrian Penal Code § 38; German Penal Code § 4(3) (going somewhat beyond the original
limits of the "exception"); Italian Penal Code art. 7. For more detail, see 29 Am. J. Int'l
L. Supp. 546-61 (1935); Note, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1441, 1473-80 (1963). For the law of the
United States, see Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927) (conspiracy to violate the
[Vol. so
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A third exception, the so-called "nationality principle," is universally
recognized;45 it permits a state to exercise criminal jurisdiction over its
nationals with respect to their extraterritorial conduct. The application
of the national criminal law to their conduct abroad is justified as
constituting the adequate counterpart of their immunity from extradition,
an immunity which is conceded by all except the Anglo-American coun-
tries.46
Objections against extension of the lex fori to conduct abroad which
did not fall within the proper bounds of these exceptions were vigorously
expressed in Judge Loder's dissenting opinion in the Lotus case. He said:
The criminal law of a State may extend to crimes and offences com-
mitted abroad by its nationals, since such nationals are subject to the law
of their own country; but it cannot extend to offences committed by a
foreigner in foreign territory, without infringing the sovereign rights of the
foreign State concerned .... 47
Such an extension may well breed resentment, as is illustrated by the
objections raised by the French Government to the prosecution of a
French national by the Turkish authorities in the Lotus affair; and by
the protest on the part of the United States, drafted by John Bassett
Moore, then Assistant Secretary of State, against Mexico in the famous
Cutting case.48 In both cases the national law, like that of a number of
other countries, 9 envisaged crimes committed anywhere, provided the
victims were nationals of the forum state. The justification for such an
prohibition laws); Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 33, at 92 (1962). The Soviet
Law of Dec. 15, 1958 on General Principles of Criminal Legislation, arts. 4-5 restricts the
competence of the courts over crimes committed abroad to Soviet nationals and stateless
persons residing in the Soviet Union; it extends this competence to foreigners only where
international treaties so provide.
45 29 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 445 (1935).
46 Id. at 123.
47 P.C.IJ. ser. A, No. 10, at 35. The term "nationals" may also embrace an alien who has
held himself out as a subject of the forum state. Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions,
[19461 A.C. 347. The decision of the Special Criminal Court of the Transvaal, Rex. v.
Neumann, 3 So. Afr. L.R. 1238 (1949) goes even a step further, since the defendant's
application for naturalization was still pending when he returned to Germany where he
then acted against the security of South Africa. Concerning the principle of non-extradition
of nationals as the rationale for criminal jurisdiction over their conduct abroad, see Bundes-
gericht der Schweiz [hereinafter cited as Swiss Fed. Trib.] Oct. 6, 1950, Kaiser und Attenhofer
v. Basel, Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtshofs Amtliche Sammlung 76
IV 209 (1950). For application of the law of the forum to crimes committed abroad by a
national, see French Code of Criminal Procedure, arts. 689-93, 695-96; German Penal Code
§ 3; Italian Penal Code art. 9; United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). For criticism
of the unconditional application of the nationality principle, see Sarkar, supra note 26, at 458.
48 Bravos District Court, Chihuahua, Mexico, The Cutting Case, Aug. 6, 1886, in Moore,
Report on Extraterritorial Crime and the Cutting Case, 1887 U.S. For. Rel. 757 (judgment
convicting American citizen for publication in Texas of libel against citizen of Mexico).
49 According to Turkish Penal Code art. 6 and Mexican Penal Code art. 4, a foreigner is
punishable for a penal offense committed in a foreign country against a Turkish or Mexican
national, respectively. Similar rules can be found in Brazilian Decree-Law of April 28, 1938,
art. 18; Chinese Criminal Code of 1935, art. 8; German Penal Code § 4(2)(2); Italian
Penal Code art. 10; and Swiss Penal Code art. 5. For analogous laws of other countries, see
29 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 578-79 (1935).
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extension of legislative 'and judicial criminal jurisdiction is based upon
a further exception to the territoriality principle called the "passive
personality principle." Thus-broadly stated, this doctrine has invited
severe criticism.50 ,
There are two threshold questions. First, must application of this
doctrine be limited to conduct which has produced "effects" within the
forum state upon a national or nationals? In the Cutting case, in similar
French cases,51 and under the legal fiction which equated a Turkish
vessel to Turkish territory in the Lotus case, the injuries were suffered
in the forum state. In -none of these cases was the assertion of jurisdic-
tion based solely on the fact that the victim was a national; and, in the
total absence of effects upon persons or things within its territory, exten-
sion of the criminal jurisdiction of a state to an alien for his extraterri-
torial conduct must be regarded as internationally impermissible. This
is the view of the American Law Institute."2
The second question is addressed to the nature and the degree of the
effects. The term "effects" is a verbal symbol calling for semantical
adjustment. In the Lotus case the Permanent Court referred to "effects,"
but it failed to furnish any key to the type of effects which are of legal
significance. It has been inferred from this omission that the Court did
not limit the exercise of jurisdiction to conduct having certain types of
effects." Where the impact of extraterritorial conduct affects the forum
state primarily and directly, the propriety of the effects test can hardly
be disputed. But this cannot be said of the extravagant extensions of
the control of the lex fori under the color of an apparently boundless
"protective principle. 5 4
Let us illustrate both points. From the standpoint of protecting the
efficient and proper functioning of the machinery of justice, the forum
may apply its criminal sanctions against a person who has given false
testimony in his deposition taken abroad before a foreign court which
furnished legal assistance to the forum state under letters rogatory. This
50 Thus, Judge Moore's dissent in the Lotus case was directed solely to art. 6 of the
Turkish Penal Code. P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 10, at 65. He agreed with the assertion of jurisdiction
where the acts done abroad produce effects within the forum state. Id. at 69-70. See also
Dickinson, supra note 41, regarding important safeguards and limitations, and Brierly, The
Law of Nations 220 (4th ed. 1949).
51 Cass. crim. July 2, 1932, Milleli, la Tribuna et Davanzati v. Turati, 60 journal du droit
international (fonde par Ed. Clunet) 380 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Clunet]; April 30,
1908, Micheli, Martin et Chauvet v. Dide, Recueil periodique et critique de jurisprudence,
de legislation et de doctrine en matiere civile, commerciale, criminelle, administrative, et de
droit public 1909 I. 241.
52 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 18, comment f at 56, § 30(2) (1962).
53 Id. Reporters' Notes No. 4, § 18, at 60-61.
54 Jessup 49-50; Sarkar, supra note 26, at 463, criticizes the German Penal Code § 4(3) (9)
by which extraterritorial traffic in obscene publications committed by foreigners is punishable.
[Vol. 50
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view, taken in an Argentine decision," was recently shared by an
American federal court in a case where the extraterritorial application
of a federal statute, to aliens who had made false statements abroad in an
immigration application, was upheld because the offenses were "directed
at the sovereignty" of the United States. 6
However, unless offenses affecting fundamental institutions of a state
are in question, it is difficult to justify application of the protective
principle. Thus, one may ask whether the conviction by a Dutch court
of a citizen and domiciliary of Belgium for violation outside of the
Netherlands of Dutch currency regulations, is reconcilable with the
concepts discussed above.57
The interests of the forum state fade into insignificance where the
conduct abroad has no connection with the life of the state itself but
only with personal interests of one of its nationals. Nevertheless, the
French courts have convicted foreign writers of articles published abroad
for defamation of French residents, and in France such convictions can
even be obtained through private action (action directe) of the person
injured.58 It is indeed startling to see such an extraterritorial extension
of the penal laws of the forum, an extension which cannot here be based
on the "effects" of the defendant's conduct upon the safety of the
state.
The American Law Institute takes a different view, deeming it ir-
relevant whether the "effects" impinge upon the interest of the state
as a whole or the interest of a particular individual, provided that one of
two prerequisites is satisfied. According to the first prerequisite, the
reach of legislation beyond domestic conduct is justified "if the conduct
and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime
or tort under the laws of states that have reasonably developed legal
systems." The second, and alternative, prerequisite is a substantiality
test; -extensive application of the lex fori is allowed if the effect is sub-
stantial and is the direct and foreseeable result of the conduct; all this
under the assumption that the rule allowing such extensive application
"is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by
states that have reasonably developed legal systems." 59
55 Criminal and Correctional Chamber of the Capital, May 15, 1936, Wera Horns,
Francisco, 54 Jurisprudencia Argentina 573.
56 United States v. Rodriquez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.). Cal. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Rocha v.
United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
57 For the conviction, see Hoge Raad (highest court of the Netherlands) Nov. 13, 1951,
Public Prosecutor v. L., Intl L. Rep. 1951 No. 48, at 206.
58 Cass. crim. July 2, 1932, supra note 51; April 30, 1908, supra note 51.
59 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, Reporter's Note No. 4, § 18, comment d, illus-
tration 4, at 60-61 (1962).
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The prevailing tendency of many states to "punish offenses committed
abroad if (their) interests so require," as a leading Swiss decision puts
it,60 might evince compliance with the second of the two alternative
prerequisites, provided the conduct at issue caused direct and foreseeable
effects of a substantial nature.
As may be apparent from the preceding discussion, there is consider-
able divergence in contemporary state practice as to the control of the
lex ori over the extraterritorial conduct of aliens. The only thing which
is indisputable is the conclusion that "there is scarcely any law" which
can be invoked against "extravagant new claims to extraterritorial juris-
diction." This leads to jurisdictional competition by several states over
the same conduct regardless of their real contacts with it.61
3. Jurisdictional Significance of Extraterritorial Subject Matter in
Private International Law
We have seen that in international penal law the question is not what
is the applicable law-it is always the lex ori-but whether that law can
control extraterritorial conduct. By contrast, in private international
law the paramount question is which of the laws of the various countries
or sister states with which the case has contacts should be applied. It
"matters (little) to any state whether its legal system is applied abroad
or not,"162 and "there are very few instances in which foreign offices have
made diplomatic complaints that a rule of the conflict of laws has been
violated to the prejudice of their citizens."' s Because of the strongly
international character of the present economic order, it is obvious that
legal measures cannot be limited to the rule of strict territoriality. Never-
theless, the desire to avoid protests and recriminations by other govern-
ments, as will be shown later in section 4, has some bearing on the at-
titude of the forum in conflict-of-laws situations.
From the standpoint of international law, a state may provide a
forum for the settlement of claims even though they arise out of con-
duct as to which it could not prescribe; 64 in other words, the state may
have judicial jurisdiction over a situation where it would have no legis-
lative jurisdiction. This does not mean that the state may assume control
over transactions which are devoid of any adequate contacts with it by
an abuse of its conflict-of-laws rules. In the view of the United States
60 Swiss Fed. Trib. October 6, 1950, supra note 47.
61 Sarkar, supra note 26, at 466.
,2 Wolff 15.
63 Jessup 63. But he qualifies his statement by referring to a case where the conflicts rule
has been embodied in a treaty; in such a case the complaint of a breach would be treated as
a matter for intergovernmental protest.
64 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 19, at 62-63 (1962), especially comments b-c.
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Supreme Court, international law does not seek uniformity of conflict
rules; "it aims at stability and order through usages which considerations
of comity, reciprocity and long-range interest have developed to define
the domain which each nation will claim as its own."' 65 Conflict rules
which would decline to give any consideration to the relevant foreign law
could, under the aspect of "denial of justice," perhaps be regarded as
internationally impermissible."
As was discussed in a preceding subsection,6 7 a state may determine
for itself the bases for its exercise of judicial jurisdiction over persons
with respect to claims of a private nature. Assuming the existence of such
a jurisdictional basis, as, for instance, the presence of the defendant
within the state, an interesting question arises: Does a legislative enact-
ment of another state to the effect that a cause of action arising there can
only be brought in a local court debar the forum from entertaining the
suit?
Such a monopolization of personal jurisdiction by a member state of
the United States has been rejected. 8 It might at first be assumed that the
freedom of such a state to determine the extent of its judicial jurisdiction
is substantially fettered because of restrictions on its sovereignty result-
ing from our dual system of government. However, the United States
Supreme Court has always emphasized that every state of the United
States, "subject to the restrictions imposed by the Federal Constitu-
tion,"' has the power "to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its
courts and the character of the controversies which shall be heard in
them. 7 O
Thus the fact that one state pronounces its own exclusive jurisdiction
over a statutory cause of action-for example, an employer's liability
for accidents-has been held to be no bar to the assumption of jurisdic-
tion over such a transitory cause of action by a sister state. Said the
Supreme Court: "Jurisdiction is to be determined by the law of the
court's creation and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation
of a statute of another State, even though it created the right of action."171
85 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
66 Baty, "The Private International Law of Japan," 2 Monumenta Nipponica No. 2, at
54-55 (1930) ; see also Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 19, comment d at 62 (1962).
67 Part A, subsection 1(a) supra.
08 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 117-1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1958). But see
Riezler, Internationales Zivilprozessrecht 205 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Riezler].
69 Thus the Supreme Court has held that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion may compel a sister state to extend its judicial jurisdiction beyond the limits set by its
own legislation. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). For a different justification,
see Currie, "The Constitution and the 'Transitory' Cause of Action," 73 Harv. L. Rev.
36 (1959).
70 McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 233 (1934).
71 Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 360 (1914). [Emphasis added.]
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If this view holds true for sister states, it does so all the more where
independent countries are involved. A proceeding instituted in a court
of one country certainly cannot be objected to upon the ground that the
courts of another may be able to assert jurisdiction over the same cause
of action. Such a position would have no basis in international law.
This view has also prevailed in other parts of the world, whether
Romanic, Germanic, or Scandinavian. It has also been stated that it
would be no more admissible to deny the national character of the law
regulating international jurisdiction than to deny that the rules of choice
of law which the courts apply are commands of their national law.72
However, there are areas where the courts of one state, in the exercise
of their discretion, will defer to the assertion of exclusive jurisdiction
by another state. Such an attitude is dictated not by a rule of inter-
national law but by respect for the legislative jurisdiction of the other
state because of its substantial connection with the subject matter.
Thus, in a recent case,73 a German court declined to entertain jurisdic-
tion over a suit to enjoin a defendant from instituting proceedings in
Belgium for violation of Belgian trademarks. The court was following
a generally observed policy of forbearance,74 but it also went so far as
to say that if the German courts entertained such a suit they would
encroach upon Belgium's sovereign powers. 75
To the rule that a merchant vessel subjects itself to the jurisdiction
of another country by entering one of its ports, international usage has
developed an exception, "generally understood among civilized nations,"
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Paris, applying art. 24 of the Bolivian Act of April 15,
1932, by which a divorce could be granted only if it would be recognized under the law of
the state of celebration of the marriage, denied significance to the statutory words "may be
dissolved in the Republic." Cour d'Appel, Paris, July 1, 19.59, Patino v. dame Patino, 87
Clunet 412 (1960).
72 6 Niboyet, Traite No. 1716, at 256; Cour de Cassation, chambre de requetes May 14,
1923, Bourgoin v. Groupement des Sinistres, Gazette du Palais 1923.2.154; Morelli 2, 5;
1 Sperl 29; Guldener, Zivilprozessrecht 1; L. von Bar, The Theory and Practice of Private
International Law § 407, at 882 (2d ed., tr. Gillespie, 1892); Riezler 203; Neuhaus, Inter-
nationales Zivilprozessrecht, 20 ZAIPR 209, 214 (1955). A practical example is also offered by
the Geneva Protocol of September 24, 1923 on Arbitration Clauses, ff 1. This provision
recognizes the validity of certain agreements "between parties subject respectively to the
jurisdiction of different Contracting States." It is generally admitted that, because of the
non-existence of an international norm on jurisdiction, the test has to be the national law
on which the assertion of jurisdiction is based. Cbmpare Morelli 226 and Nussbaum,
Deutsches Internationales Privatrecht 474 (1932).
73 Bundesgerichtshof, July 13, 1954 [hereinafter cited as B.G.H.]; 14 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilachen 286 [hereinafter cited as B.G.H.Z.).
74 For the reasons explaining this attitude, see ch. 8 of the author's forthcoming
book. See also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952), intimating -that a
valid foreign trademark registration might "affect either the power [of an American court]
to enjoin or the propriety of its exercise."
75 The position of the lower courts was not disputed by the B.G.H; it reversed only because
the plaintiffs' demand was not, as the lower courts construed it, aimed at prohibition of a
proceeding in Belgium, but at enjoining the defendants from alleging that plaintiffs' trade-
marks infringed upon defendants' rights.
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for all matters of discipline and all things done on board which affect only
the vessel or those belonging to her, and do not involve the peace or
dignity of the country, or the tranquillity of the port.78 Jurisdiction over
these matters is left to the competent authorities, particularly the consuls,
of the state of registry. Controversies between master and crew concern-
ing working conditions and the like are also usually referred by bilateral
treaties to the jurisdiction of the authorities of the state of registry,77
but a generally accepted customary rule to this effect has not yet emerged.
As a result of overlapping governmental regulations, delimitation of
legislative jurisdiction in this area would be desirable, but it is hardly
possible since a merely territorial test is unsuited to matters of labor
law, and particularly to maritime labor relations. The law of the flag
has for some time been regarded as an important factor and has almost
universally excluded local jurisdiction over matters relating to the in-
ternal discipline and order of foreign ships. Can this ancient notion be
applied to the field of the most modern labor regulations?
In a recent case, McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras,78 the Supreme Court took the view that it could, thus avoiding
a head-on collision with the assertion of jurisdiction by the authorities of
Honduras. In this case, the National Labor Relations Board, in com-
pliance with the demand of an American union seeking certification
under the Act as the representative of seamen employed upon Honduran-
flag vessels, ordered an election. The vessels were owned by a Honduran
corporation which, however, was a wholly owned subsidiary of an
American corporation. Under the Honduran Labor Code, only a domestic
union can represent seamen on Honduran-registered ships. A collective
contract had been entered into with such a union and by the law of that
country the corporation was compelled to deal exclusively with the
Honduran union.
In affirming the decision of the district court which had enjoined the
election, the Supreme Court referred to the "well-established rule of
76 Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 12 (1887), quoted in United States v. Flores, 289 U.S.
137, 158 (1933), which in turn is quoted in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585-86
(1953). As early as 1806, the French Conseil d'Etat, in the case of "The Sally," where a
personal injury was inflicted on a seaman by an officer while an American ship was in a
French port, decided against the jurisdiction of the French courts. For the case, see 1
Phillimore, Commentaries Upon International Law 484 (3d ed. 1879). See also Colombos,
The International Law of the Sea 222-23 (3d rev. ed. 1954).
77 This is no longer true of treaties to which the United States is a party as a result of
enactment of the Seamen's Act of 1915. See Van der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297
U.S. 114 (1936). German law proceeds upon the proposition that a member of the crew
cannot bring a suit against the master before a foreign court. See Wustendorfer, in 7/2
Ehrenberg, Handbuch des gesamten Handelsrechts 678 (1921).
78 372 U.S. 10 (1963). Two companion cases -had been consolidated with this case by the
Supreme Court.
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international law,"179 that the law of the flag ordinarily governs the
internal affairs of the ship,8 ° and noted that, from the standpoint of
international law, as evidenced by State Department regulations and
by treaty, the foreign character of vessels, regardless of ownership, is
determined by the fact of their registration in a foreign state. 1 The
Court therefore refused to construe the National Labor Relations Act
to have any application to foreign registered vessels employing alien
seamen. It quoted from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in The Charm-
ing Betsy the famous passage to the effect that "an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains. '8 2
Concerning other jurisdictional problems we may briefly note that a
country may regard foreign judicial directives which have some extra-
national flavor, such as orders requiring the inspection of documents
located within its territory or their removal from there along with the
request for their production in the forum, as a violation of its territorial
sovereignty. The examination of such cases, very important in antitrust
litigation, calls for particular discussion in subsequent sections.
Leaving aside for the moment the discussion on foreign-based barriers,
it can be said that the forum in possession of judicial jurisdiction over
a person can issue orders directing him to do or to refrain from doing
an act within the territory of another state. This matter will be dis-
cussed in section 3 of this chapter 2 of the author's forthcoming book.
4. Competitive Bases of Civil Jurisdiction Over a Particular Matter:
A bstinentia Fori
As the Latin subtitle suggests, the emphasis here is upon abstention
by a court from the exercise of international judicial jurisdiction which
the state clearly possesses.
If the law of one or more other states is potentially applicable in a
particular case, the forum is faced with the problem, puzzling at times,
of making a choice: for customary international law has not yet devel-
oped imperative tests in this regard., In making its choice, it may be
guided by its concern with foreign relations, as is well illustrated in
the judgment of the United States Supreme Court in Lauritzen v.
Larsen.4 Here three states had major contacts with the situation at
79 Id. at 21.
80 Ibid.
81 Id. at 20-21.
82 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
83 Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 39, comment b at 114 (1962).
84 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
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hand, namely the United States, Denmark, and Cuba. The ship's articles,
written in Danish and providing for control by Danish law, were signed
in New York aboard the Danish defendant's ship of Danish registration.
The seaman, who was of Danish nationality and domicile, was injured
in the course of his employment aboard ship in Havana harbor, and
sued for damages under the Jones Act. In balancing all these different
contacts, and comparing the provisions of the potentially applicable
national laws as to coverage and liability, and analyzing all the policy
considerations, the Supreme Court held that the case did not fall within
the Jones Act. In its view, the forum should forbear from applying its
law since the foreign connecting factors were more significant than the
American ones. This result was reached "by ascertaining and valuing
points of contact."85 It has even been suggested that the Court went as
far as to hold "the Jones Act inapplicable to avoid a violation of inter-
national law."8 6 However, there is nothing in the language of the opinion
which lends support to such an interpretation. What the Court did was
only to add a warning shaped in these words:
[I]n dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of the
necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided; nor should
we forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to warrant application
of our law to a foreign transaction will logically be as strong a warrant for
a foreign country to apply its law to an American transaction.8 7
As the use of the words "foreign transaction" shows, the argument for
forbearance obtains persuasive force once the transaction has been
found to fall within the legislative jurisdiction of a foreign country.
As was seen in the Lauritzen case, where a decision is based on the
forum's lack of legislative jurisdiction, this decision presupposes the
existence of judicial jurisdiction.8 Only exceptionally does judicial juris-
diction depend upon the existence of legislative jurisdiction. The ex-
ception is illustrated by a French divorce case where, briefly stated,
the situation was as follows: The wife, a British national by birth, but
an Italian citizen and domiciliary by her marriage to an Italian citizen
in Italy, had been granted permission by an Italian judge to live sepa-
rately. Thereupon she established a residence (not a domicile) in France
where she brought an action for divorce. French jurisdiction was not
contested by the defendant, who was still domiciled in Italy; but the
French judges held that since Italian law, which does not permit divorce,
85 Id. at 582.
86 Note, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1441, 1483 (1963).
87 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
88 Compare Louis-Lucas, Existe-t-il une competence generale du droit francais pour le
reglement des conflits de lois? 48 Revue critique de droit international prive 405, 407-08
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Rev.]; Ponsard, infra note 89, at 805.
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must be regarded as controlling, they could not entertain the action.
This result compelled dismissal by reason of territorial incompetence,
which in a divorce case can be pronounced by the court on its own
motion. 9
We live in an era of constantly increasing legislation of the regulatory
type. As a result the forum may be confronted with a demand based on
regulatory provisions of its own law although the operative facts of
the case show a significant connection with another state whose law
lacks any similar legislation. Illustrations may be helpful:
An Austrian was sued before an Austrian court by a German competi-
tor who charged him with acts of unfair competition committed in
Yugoslavia. These acts were forbidden under Austrian law but not
under the law of Yugoslavia. Accordingly, the forum denied that there
was a jurisdictional basis for the enforcement of its legislation."
Again, in a recent case concerning the imitation by the German defend-
ant of a feeding-bottle manufactured by the American plaintiff, the
German courts denied the existence of German legislative jurisdiction.
While it was true that the defendant had manufactured the imitation in
Germany, it was distributed exclusively on foreign markets.91 On the
other hand, German decisions in the last few decades indicate that
even where conduct has taken place abroad exclusively, the courts will
entertain an action based on the German law against unfair competition,
if both plaintiff and defendant are German nationals and, in addition,
they have industrial establishments in Germany.92
5. A Few Words on the International Position of Civil Judgments
Our analysis of the international laws and rules on international
jurisdiction will be concluded with a brief discussion of the related prob-
lem of the international position of civil judgments. From the stand-
point of international relations, nothing could be more advantageous
than the recognition of foreign judgments; but this ideal goal cannot
be attained until the various states achieve some agreement on the
89 Paris, Nov. 10, 1959, Dawn Addams v. Massimo, 87 Clunet 792, note Ponsard (1960);
49 Rev. 218, note Francescakis (1960), holding that Italian law controls, either as the law
of the last common domicile, which operates under the French rule where the spouses are
of different nationality, or as the law of the husband's domicile under the British test. While
as a rule the parties must, under the sanction of preclusion, raise the "exception" of ter-
ritorial incompetence ("incompetence ratione loci") at the threshold of the proceedings, C.
pr. civ. art. 171(3) provides for such a pronouncement ex officio by the judge in cases where
the parties are not allowed to compromise on their rights.
9o O.G.H., June 11, 1930, SZ XII/142.
91 B.G.H., June 30, 1961, S.P.R.C. & E. v. K., 35 B.G.H.Z. 329.
92 B.G.H., July 24, 1957, Zeiss, 60 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrechtliche
Zeitschrift 189, 197 (1958); RG Feb. 17, 1933, Sch. et al. v. H., 140 Entscheidungen des
Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 25.
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principles controlling the distribution of civil jurisdiction. At present
each nation is at liberty to determine not only the limits upon the exercise
of jurisdiction by its own courts, but also the range of jurisdiction which
it is willing to concede to foreign states.
In later chapters of this study the requirements for recognition of
foreign judgments will be the subject of a comprehensive discussion.
Only this need be said in advance: Every country requires compliance
with certain jurisdictional standards as a fundamental condition for its
recognition of foreign judgments. This position is intended to furnish
the strongest safeguard against any adverse effects which might result
from the exercise of jurisdiction by foreign states. By the law of a great
many countries, these standards are those which the forum applies to
its own judgments. 3 On occasion, however, the law of the forum applies
a less stringent test to the jurisdiction of its own courts than the test
it uses to measure the proper limits of foreign jurisdiction. In his noted
opinion in the case of Schibsby v. Westenholz, Judge Blackburn ad-
mitted "with perfect candour" the use of such a dual standard. 4 English
domestic law has conferred upon the English courts the power to
summon a non-resident alien who is a party to an English contract,95
but in the Schibsby case the court refused to enforce a French judgment
based on analogous ground. To be sure, the English court could not,
and did not, consider the French rules of competence as being contrary
to natural justice 5 Obviously the explanation for the discrepancy was
the application of different rules to different situations. An English
court sitting in an original action exercises its traditional common-law
powers plus new powers vested in it by Parliament; but when dealing
with the enforcement of a foreign judgment, it applies its conflict-of-
laws rules.97 Therefore any assumption 98 that Judge Blackburn refused
to enforce the French judgment because he was acting as an enforce-
ment agency of the international community, has no basis in his whole
reasoning, and is therefore fallacious.
IM Piggott, Foreign Judgments 104 (3d ed. 1908).
94 L.R. 6 Q.B. 155, 160 (1870).
95 Order XI rule 1(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature.
96 See Dicey, Conflict of Laws 1012 & n.99a (7th ed., 1958).
97 Sunderland, "The Problem of Jurisdiction," 4 Texas L. Rev. 429, 444 (1926); see also
Harper, Taintor, Carnahan & Brown, Cases on Conflict of Laws 680-81 & n.15 (1950).
98 Stevenson, "The Relationship of Private International Law to Public International
Law," 52 Colum. L. Rev. 561, 580 (1952). See Griswold's excellent remarks in his review of
Read, "Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the Common Law Units of
the British Commonwealth," 16 Can. B. Rev. 659 (1938).
